The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany
Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.
Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion
1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)
1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)
1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.
2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.
国家税务总局关于印发《境外所得个人所得税征收管理暂行办法》的通知
国家税务总局
国家税务总局关于印发《境外所得个人所得税征收管理暂行办法》的通知
1998年8月12日，国家税务总局
各省、自治区、直辖市和计划单列市地方税务局：
为了维护国家税收权益，加强对来源于中国境外所得的个人所得税征收管理，总局制定了《境外所得个人所得税征收管理暂行办法》，现印发给你们，请结合本地实际情况，认真组织实施。
执行中如有问题，请及时报告。
境外所得个人所得税征收管理暂行办法
第一条 为维护国家税收权益，加强对来源于中国境外所得的个人所得税征收管理，根据《中华人民共和国个人所得税法》（以下简称税法）及其实施条例、《中华人民共和国税收征收管理法》（以下简称征管法）及其实施细则以及有关行政法规的规定制定本办法。
第二条 本办法适用于在中国境内有住所，并有来源于中国境外所得的个人纳税人（以下简称纳税人）。
第三条 纳税人来源于中国境外的各项应纳税所得（以下简称境外所得），应依照税法和本办法的规定缴纳个人所得税。
第四条 下列所得，不论支付地点是否在中国境外，均为来源于中国境外的所得：
（一）因任职、受雇、履约等而在中国境外提供劳务取得的所得；
（二）将财产出租给承租人在中国境外使用而取得的所得；
（三）转让中国境外的建筑物、土地使用权等财产或者在中国境外转让其他财产取得的所得；
（四）许可各种特许权在中国境外使用而取得的所得；
（五）从中国境外的公司、企业以及其他经济组织或者个人取得的利息、股息、红利所得。
第五条 纳税人的境外所得，包括现金、实物和有价证券。
第六条 纳税人的境外所得，应按税法及其实施条例的规定确定应税项目，并分别计算其应纳税额。
第七条 纳税人的境外所得按照有关规定交付给派出单位的部分，凡能提供有效合同或有关凭证的，经主管税务机关审核后，允许从其境外所得中扣除。
第八条 纳税人受雇于中国境内的公司、企业和其他经济组织以及政府部门并派往境外工作，其所得由境内派出单位支付或负担的，境内派出单位为个人所得税扣缴义务人，税款由境内派出单位负责代扣代缴。其所得由境外任职、受雇的中方机构支付、负担的，可委托其境内派出（投资）机构代征税款。
上述境外任职、受雇的中方机构是指中国境内的公司、企业和其他经济组织以及政府部门所属的境外分支机构、使（领）馆、子公司、代表处等。
第九条 纳税人有下列情形的，应自行申报纳税：
（一）境外所得来源于两处以上的；
（二）取得境外所得没有扣缴义务人、代征人的（包括扣缴义务人、代征人未按规定扣缴或征缴税款的）。
第十条 中国境内的公司、企业和其他经济组织以及政府部门，凡有外派人员的，应在每一公历年度（以下简称年度）终了后30日内向主管税务机关报送外派人员情况。内容主要包括：外派人员的姓名、身份证或护照号码、职务、派往国家和地区、境外工作单位名称和地址、合同期限、境内外收入状况、境内住所及缴纳税收情况等。
第十一条 依本办法第九条规定须自行申报纳税的纳税人，应在年度终了后30日内，向中国主管税务机关申报缴纳个人所得税。如所得来源国与中国的纳税年度不一致，年度终了后30日内申报纳税有困难的，可报经中国主管税务机关批准，在所得来源国的纳税年度终了、结清税款后30日内申报纳税。
纳税人如在税法规定的纳税年度期间结束境外工作任务回国，应当在回国后的次月7日内，向主管税务机关申报缴纳个人所得税。
第十二条 纳税人兼有来源于中国境内、境外所得的，应按税法规定分别减除费用并计算纳税。
第十三条 扣缴义务人、代征人所扣（征）的税款，应当在次月7日内缴入国库，并向主管税务机关报送扣（征）缴个人所得税报告表以及税务机关要求报送的其他资料。
第十四条 纳税人在境外已缴纳的个人所得税税额，能提供境外税务机关填发的完税凭证原件的，准予按照税法及其实施条例的规定从应纳税额中抵扣。
第十五条 纳税人和扣缴义务人未按本办法规定申报缴纳、扣缴个人所得税以及未按本办法第十条规定报送资料的，主管税务机关应按征管法及有关法律、行政法规和部门规章的规定予以处罚，涉嫌犯罪的依法移送公安机关处理。
第十六条 纳税人取得的境外所得为美元、日元和港币的，按照填开完税凭证的上一月最后一日中国人民银行公布的人民币对上述三种货币的基准汇价，折合成人民币计算缴纳税款。
纳税人取得的境外所得为上述三种货币以外的其他货币的，应根据填开完税凭证的上一月最后一日美元对人民币的基准汇价和国家外汇管理局提供的同日纽约外汇市场美元对主要外币的汇价进行套算，按套算后的汇价作为折合汇率计算缴纳税款。套算公式为：
某种货币对人民币汇价＝美元对人民币的基准汇价÷纽约外汇市场美元对该种货币的汇价
第十七条 在年度终了后自行申报纳税的，对已经按月或者按次预缴税款的外国货币所得，不再重新折算；对应当补缴税款的所得部分，按照上一纳税年度最后一日中国人民银行公布的人民币对美元、日元和港币三种货币的基准汇价，折合成人民币计算应纳税所得额，如所得为三种货币以外的其他货币的，按照上一纳税年度最后一日美元对人民币的基准汇价和国家外汇管理局提供的同日纽约外汇市场美元对主要外币的汇价进行套算折合成人民币计算应纳税所得额。
第十八条 本办法所称主管税务机关是指派出单位所在地的税务机关。无派出单位的，是指纳税人离境前户籍所在地的税务机关；户籍所在地与经常居住地不一致的，是指经常居住地税务机关。
第十九条 本办法未尽事宜，按照有关税收法律、行政法规的规定执行。
第二十条 各省、自治区、直辖市地方税务局可根据本办法规定的原则，结合本地实际制定具体实施办法，并报国家税务总局备案。
第二十一条 本办法由国家税务总局负责解释。
第二十二条 本办法从1998年7月1日起执行。此前规定与本办法有抵触的，按本办法执行。
